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Foreword 
This document summarises the findings of the external independent review of the storage plan 
for the proposed Peterhead Carbon Capture and Storage project. 
 
As the Peterhead CCS project is part of the UK CCS Commercialisation Competition, which has 
not yet reached its conclusion, some of the material referred to in this report is not publicly 
accessible. However many of these documents have been made publicly available online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/carbon-capture-and-storage-knowledge-sharing  
as part of the Knowledge Transfer element of the CCS programme. More will become available 
over the next year. 
 
While the external review process concluded in July 2014, some of the text of the report has 
since been updated to reflect changes made to the draft content of Shell’s Storage Permit 
Application. 
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Executive Summary 
This document summarises the findings of an external independent review of the storage plan for 
the proposed Peterhead Carbon Capture and Storage project which aims to store up to 20 million 
tonnes (Mt) of CO2 within the framework of the European Directive on the geological storage of 
CO2. 
 
The Peterhead Carbon Capture and Storage Project proposes to capture carbon dioxide (CO2) 
from an existing gas-fired power-station at Peterhead and to store this in geological strata at a 
depth of around 2600 m beneath the outer Moray Firth. The plan is to store 10 - 15 Mt of CO2 
over a ten to fifteen-year period commencing around 2020, but the site is being qualified for 20 
Mt to allow for potential extension of the injection period. Storage will utilise the depleted 
Goldeneye gas condensate field with the Captain Sandstone reservoir as the primary storage 
container. The Storage Site covers some 70 km2, and comprises the Captain Sandstone and 
underlying strata of the Cromer Knoll Group, bounded by a polygon some 2 to 3 km outside of 
the original Goldeneye oil-water contact. The Storage Complex is larger, around 154 km2, 
bounded some 2 to 7 km outside of the original oil-water contact, and extending upwards to the 
top of the Dornoch Mudstone at a depth of more than 800 m. The top-seal of the primary 
container is a proven caprock for natural gas and is formed by the mudstones of the Upper 
Cromer Knoll Group, the overlying Rødby and Hidra formations and the Plenus Marl. A number 
of additional seals are present in the overburden within the Storage Complex, as are a number of 
potential secondary containers which could also serve as monitoring horizons.  
 
The geological interpretation of the storage site is based on the comprehensive datasets acquired 
during the discovery, appraisal and development of the Goldeneye field, and also data from other 
wells, fields and seismic surveys in the surrounding area. The static geological model of the 
storage site and adjacent aquifer has been stress tested for the key uncertainties, and it is 
considered to be robust. The storage capacity of the Goldeneye structure has been calculated 
using both static (volumetric) methods and dynamic flow modelling together with uncertainty 
analysis. Total estimated capacity of the structural closure is in the range 25 to 47 Mt and so 
robustly exceeds the proposed injected amount. 
 
A large number of CO2 injection scenarios have been assessed using different well 
configurations and testing uncertainties in the static model, including possible worst-case 
scenarios. The injection plan is extremely robust in terms of plume migration and pressure 
development, and significant irregularities are considered to be very unlikely. A key aspect of 
the storage is the ‘pressure sink’ effect of the depleted field. Reservoir pressure at the start of 
injection will be less than 70 % of hydrostatic and will remain substantially below ambient 
pressure for the duration of the injection operation. The tendency therefore will be for fluids to 
flow into the storage reservoir rather than out of it, which is a major positive safety factor. 
 
A comprehensive risk assessment has been carried out based on the bow-tie method, linking 
threats to consequences via a range of preventative and corrective measures. Potential risks 
include short and long-term releases of CO2 to seabed, sub-sea and platform, lateral migration to 
adjacent fields and wellbores, and lateral migration of dissolved CO2. Wellbores within and 
around the Goldeneye field are identified as the main potential leakage risk. All have an effective 
primary sealing barrier at top reservoir, and some have a secondary sealing barrier higher in the 
Storage Complex. In addition, a detailed analysis has been carried out of the specific risk profile 
at each well and this is considered to be robust. 
 
The measurement, monitoring and verification (MMV) plan aims to demonstrate containment 
and conformance and is closely linked to the risk assessment. The main surveillance element 
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focusses on the reservoir and overburden and utilises a limited number of proven technologies: 
time-lapse 3D seismics, together with down-hole pressure, temperature, geophysical logging and 
fluid sampling – the latter to be deployed both in the injection wells and in a dedicated 
monitoring well. A comprehensive shallow environmental monitoring programme is also 
planned, employing seabed imaging, seabed sampling and seawater sampling technologies. 
Robust baseline datasets will be acquired for both the deep-focussed and shallow monitoring 
elements, and we consider the overall plan to be fit for purpose.  
 
The corrective measures plan is based on the risk assessment and focusses on addressing 
significant irregularities, with the ultimate aim of preventing or repairing leakage or emissions of 
CO2. Leakage scenarios have been assessed, prioritising various possibilities for wellbore 
leakage, but also addressing leakage via the geological pathways. A comprehensive portfolio of 
corrective measures has been designed ranging from additional contingency monitoring, through 
adaptation of the injection programme, to wellbore interventions, and if necessary, a full well kill 
by the drilling of a new relief well. 
 
The provisional post-closure plan is designed to meet the requirements of the European Directive 
in a pragmatic and cost-effective way and aims to transfer responsibility for the site within ten 
years after cessation of injection. Platforms and wells will be closed within three years of ceasing 
injection, with down-hole monitoring maintained for as long as practicable. Additional post-
closure monitoring will comprise two 3D seismic surveys and two seabed / environmental 
surveys. The former is to demonstrate no leakage and long term gravitational-stabilisation, the 
latter to demonstrate no leakage or emissions. Resources will also be made available for the UK 
authority to carry out two post-transfer seabed emissions surveys. Overall we consider the plan 
to be very satisfactory. 
 
It is clear that the technical studies carried out by Shell are founded on a comprehensive suite of 
modern high-quality datasets and are very robust. We conclude therefore that the Goldeneye 
storage site is characterised and understood to a high level of detail and is suitable for the 
purpose of storing up to 20 million tonnes of CO2 injected according to the specified plan. The 
British Geological Survey has prepared a signed statement to this effect. 
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1 Introduction 
This document summarises the findings of an external independent review of the storage plan for 
the proposed Peterhead Carbon Capture and Storage project. 
 
The review took place between January and June 2014 via an iterative process of document 
review, response and discussion. The initial stage involved review of 20 technical documents 
(Appendix 1). Issues arising from this initial review were transmitted to Shell and addressed in a 
two-day Engagement Session between Shell and the review team in Aberdeen on 5-6 March 
2014. The Engagement Session comprised 14 technical presentations (Appendix 2) from Shell 
and detailed discussions on the points of issue. A set of remaining issues were then transmitted to 
Shell for response and actions. Actions included additional modelling, clarifications and text re-
drafting. A second, one-day Engagement Session was held in Aberdeen on 20 May 2014. This 
comprised 13 presentations (Appendix 3) from Shell addressing the points of issue and further 
detailed discussions. A draft review report was produced and, after provision of further 
documents (Appendix 4), remaining minor residual issues were addressed. The review was 
finalised on 31 July 2014. 
  
It is noteworthy that all the contributors from the Shell team participated fully and openly at both 
Engagement Sessions, that the responses from the various members of the team were consistent 
with one another, and that issues raised and discussed at and after the first Engagement Session 
had been studied in detail, with additional results presented and discussed at the second 
Engagement Session. 
 
Our conclusion is that the proposed Goldeneye storage site is suitable for the purpose of storing 
up to 20 million tonnes of CO2 injected according to the specified plan. BGS have signed a 
statement to this effect (Annex 1). 
 
The outcome of the Review is outlined below, under headers corresponding to the main scientific 
and operational topics. 
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2 Selection and characterisation of the storage site and 
storage complex  
2.1 DEFINITIONS 
Key definitions cited in the draft Storage Permit Application conform to those in Directive 
2009/31/EC of the European Union, on the geological storage of carbon dioxide (henceforth the 
Directive).  
 
The storage site essentially comprises the depleted Goldeneye gas condensate field, the reservoir 
of which comprises the Captain Sandstone of the Cromer Knoll Group, being bounded by a 
polygon that lies a short distance (~2 to ~3 km) beyond the original oil-water contact and of area 
~70 km2. It comprises all the geological formations from the top of the Kimmeridge Clay (base 
Cromer Knoll Group) to the top of the Captain Sandstone, the latter at a depth of about 2500 m 
at the top of the structure. The storage site is overlain by the storage seal which is a proven seal 
for natural gas and comprises the Upper Valhall Member of the Cromer Knoll Group, the Rodby 
and Hidra formations and the Plenus Marl.  
 
The storage complex is bounded by a larger polygon, ranging from ~2 to ~7 km beyond the 
original oil-water contact and of area ~154 km2. It comprises all strata from the top of the 
Kimmeridge Clay to the top of the regionally persistent Dornoch Mudstone at a depth of more 
than 800 m. 
 
The storage site and storage complex are both logically defined and likely to prove effective in 
operation. The storage complex definition is particularly robust. Its outer boundary lies well 
beyond any plausible CO2 migration pathway and its upper boundary comprises two regionally 
extensive sealing units, the Lista and Dornoch mudstones. In addition it contains a number of 
additional seals and secondary containment units, the latter potentially suitable as monitoring 
horizons.  
 
2.2 GEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION AND STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATION 
The geological interpretation of the storage site is based on the comprehensive set of data 
acquired during the discovery, appraisal and development of the Goldeneye gas condensate field, 
but it also utilises a wide spread of data from other wells, fields and seismic surveys in the region 
around the field. In our view this dataset is sufficient to adequately characterise the storage site 
and storage complex.  
 
The geological and geophysical characterisation of the storage site and storage complex is 
described in a range of technical reports and the draft Storage Permit Application (Appendix 1). 
The studies are all highly detailed and meet the requirements for site characterisation described 
in Annex 1 of the Directive. It describes the reservoir, seal and other rock properties of the 
geological formations comprising the storage site and storage complex, and their three-
dimensional stratigraphy and structure, including an interpretation of the stress field, faults and 
fractures in these rock volumes and the seismicity of the region around the site. It also describes 
inter alia the pressure and temperature regime and the fluids initially and residually in place in 
the reservoir, including the charge history of the hydrocarbon field. It demonstrates the secure 
nature of the natural trap for buoyant fluids that is the Goldeneye reservoir and its sealing units 
(the Rodby, Hidra and Plenus Marl formations). It also describes the potential for secondary 
containment in the rocks above the reservoir topseal, principally in the Palaeocene Mey 
Sandstone Member of the Lista Formation.  
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The main site characterisation issues resulting from the review and explored with Shell were:  
 
 Imaging and resolution limitations of the 3D seismic surveys and consequent 
uncertainties in the interpretation of the three-dimensional stratigraphy and geometry of 
the storage site and fault patterns and linkages within it.   
 
 Structural and stratigraphical continuity or compartmentalisation within the Captain 
Sandstone and significance of uncertainty in these properties. 
 
 Faults in the reservoir and potential links to faults in the overburden. 
 
 The significance of uncertainty in the depth conversion and the extent to which resulting 
errors in three-dimensional reservoir geometry were significant. 
 
 Lateral continuity and thickness of the primary container topseal. 
 
Based on the initial review, the response from Shell (further static and dynamic modelling to 
address the points raised) and subsequent re-review, we conclude that the storage site and 
complex have been characterised to a suitable level of detail and accuracy.  
 
2.3 STATIC MODELS 
A range of three-dimensional static geological models of the storage site have been built 
specifically for the storage project using PetrelTM software. These comprise a range of Static 
Reservoir Models, the Overburden Model and a model of the wider Captain fairway (the Aquifer 
Model). They have been used by Shell to calculate the storage capacity of the site and have 
formed the basis for a comprehensive dynamic modelling study (Section 4).  
 
The main static modelling issues resulting from the review and explored with Shell were:  
 
 Whether the full range of potentially adverse geological characteristics (inter alia 
reservoir and spill-point geometry, reservoir fluid flow properties, fault distributions and 
linkages) that might occur had been properly captured in the range of static models. 
 
 The statistical procedures used to obtain the reservoir properties for the static reservoir 
model.  
 
Based on the initial review, the response from Shell (including further static and dynamic 
modelling) and subsequent re-review, we conclude that the static geological modelling is 
sufficiently accurate and includes a robust range of uncertainties such as to fully meet the 
requirements of the project [Note: a specific ‘stress test’ was carried out involving the inclusion 
of an arbitrary high permeability thief zone from one of the injection wells to the spill-point of 
the structure. This was subsequently dynamically modelled with no adverse consequences 
(Section 4)]. 
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3 Rock and fluid properties and interactions 
A number of detailed ancillary studies, including laboratory measurements and a range of 
modelling studies, were carried out to assess rock and fluid properties and interactions within the 
storage complex (Appendix 1). 
 
3.1 SPECIAL CORE ANALYSIS (SCAL) 
Interpretation of the rock and fluid properties of the storage site is based on the comprehensive 
set of legacy core and geophysical log data acquired during the discovery, appraisal and 
development wells of the Goldeneye gas condensate field, and other wells in the region.  
 
Extensive steady-state imbibition and drainage core-flood experiments had previously been 
carried out to characterise the hydrocarbon / brine system during the primary depletion phase.  
These data had been validated by virtue of a good match between the dynamic model and 
observed data during the hydrocarbon production phase of field life. Additional unsteady-state 
tests involving CO2 were then carried out, with the objective of assessing factors that would 
influence CO2 mobility, a key to determining CO2 injectivity and potential migration.  To avoid 
likely capillary end effects, up to 20 cm long cores were used in this latter phase of experimental 
work.  Gas phase relative permeabilites were shown to be little changed by the introduction of 
CO2.  Brine CO2 interfacial tensions were also measured, with values consistent with those 
reported in the literature.  There is some uncertainty as to the extent of capillary trapping when 
CO2 is displaced through rock initially at 100% water saturation, but as the dynamic modelling 
shows that CO2 will not migrate beyond the spill point, this is not a critical issue. 
 
The main issues resulting from the review and explored with Shell were: 
 
 Clarification and justification of laboratory procedures, their limitations and consequent 
uncertainty range in the properties assigned to the static and dynamic models. 
 
 Extent to which relative permeability and capillary pressures are the same for 
hydrocarbon gas / brine and CO2 / brine systems. 
 
 
In our view this dataset is sufficient to adequately characterise the storage site and storage 
complex. The reservoir and overburden properties derived from these data underpin the 
attribution of the static and dynamic models (Sections 2 and 4 respectively). 
 
3.2 PVT  
As with SCAL data, the originally developed Equation of State had been validated by virtue of 
the match between the dynamic model and observed flow data. A Peng Robinson Equation of 
State was tuned with pure CO2 based on a six component system. National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) measured properties were used in calculating the Equation of State - the 
NIST data being widely accepted as the most reliable to use for such calculations.  Pure CO2 was 
assumed, a reasonable assumption given the CO2 source will be gas fired power generation 
equipment, typically a source of CO2 relatively free of impurities. The PVT calculations have 
been reproduced (assuming pure CO2). Restriction on well diameter to maintain tubing head 
pressure and avoid excessive Joule-Thomson cooling during steady state injection and during 
start-up and shut-in, is conservative but nonetheless appropriate. 
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3.3 GEOCHEMICAL INTERACTIONS  
The geochemical issues at Goldeneye appear to be quite generic and the assessment is in line 
with previous research findings at storage sites elsewhere. Shell has run a number of model 
simulations with ‘worst case’ scenarios in a number of attempts to ‘break the system’. These 
ranged from short-term effects such as the development of dry-out zones and salt precipitation 
around the wellbore and much longer term effects related to reservoir, topseal and wellbore 
chemical integrity. The studies all showed that geochemical and chemical effects are likely to be 
minor. It was usually the case that not enough new water/CO2 was available in the reactive 
system to overcome buffering and allow reactions to continue long-term. In particular it was 
always the case that insufficient mobile CO2 and water were available to produce significant 
adverse effects in the vicinity of wellbores.  
 
The main geochemical issues resulting from the review and explored with Shell were:  
 
 Integrity of faults (in the presence of CO2 and water) 
 Integrity of reservoir rock (in the presence of CO2 and water) 
 Integrity of topseal (in the presence of CO2 and water) 
 Integrity of wellbores (in the presence of CO2 and water) 
 Near-wellbore effects (injectivity, porosity/permeability and formation strength 
modification)  
 
Based on the initial review, additional information and clarifications from Shell and subsequent 
re-review, we conclude that geochemical interactions are sufficiently well understood to pose no 
significant threat to project operation.  
 
3.4 GEOMECHANICAL INTERACTIONS  
The programme of rock mechanics testing reported is appropriate. Although the number of 
samples tested was low, this is commonplace, and the sequence of testing was suitable for the 
application (depletion and then inflation), and the measured values are consistent with what 
would be expected from a weak/friable formation. Comparisons with other measurements 
conducted for the same field are valid and the results are consistent. 
 
The geomechanical modelling is consistent in its use of laboratory derived data, assumptions, 
and relative to corresponding data in the dynamic simulation model. Where required, data values 
obtained from the literature have been used. A significant conclusion is that tensile failure will 
not occur. In all the sensitivities, the calculations indicate that there will be stability in the 
reservoir and the caprock, even in the worst case of very weak, unconsolidated rock with 
maximum depletion pressure. 
 
The main threat to instability in the reservoir and the over/underburden is identified as the 
compressive shear stresses that might be produced from the depletion/injection process. For the 
stresses calculated, the values of shear stress will not affect the stability. Extending the range of 
values that could represent the mechanical parameters of the reservoir / overburden / 
underburden the material still does not fail, and this gives assurance that shear failure is unlikely. 
A related issue is the possibility of induced strains in the overburden due to the depletion / 
injection cycle causing the formation of new micro-annuli along the casing / cement / rock 
interfaces. This was tested by additional geomechanical modelling. 
 
Two issues in particular were reviewed and explored with Shell:  
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 Given the uncertainty in the interpreted fault distribution and fault orientations, in order 
to maintain a conservative approach it was recommended that the fault stability analysis 
include a hypothetical optimally-oriented, cohesionless fault with a low friction co-
efficient, in order to show that faults in the reservoir or overburden would not be 
reactivated by pressure changes.  
 
 Near wellbore geomechanical interactions between the wellbores (compaction/expansion 
and displacement) and the overburden, the possible development of micro-annuli, and 
how this might affect wellbore integrity.  
 
Based on the initial review, Shell undertook additional dynamic modelling studies to test the 
issues raised. These included the requested fully conservative fault stability analysis and also 
geomechanical modelling of the wellbore- rock interfaces (see also Section 6). In the light of this 
we conclude that a comprehensive geomechanical analysis has been carried out, based on an 
experimental programme and associated geomechanical modelling. This thorough analysis leads 
to the conclusion that the risk of geomechanical failure affecting storage security is very low.   
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4 Reservoir engineering 
A comprehensive dynamic fluid flow modelling effort has been carried out, including detailed 
history matching with the hydrocarbon production phase, and a range of predictive injection 
models, on a range of time-scales, to assess uncertainty. The models have been used to: 
 
a) Model the injection and long-term storage of CO2 in the storage site including the 
distribution of CO2 and pressure through time. 
 
b) Help demonstrate the robustness of the long-term security of storage within the site.  
 
c) Model the potential long-term fate of any CO2 in the unlikely event that it somehow 
breaches the natural and man-made barriers and leaks out of the storage complex. 
 
A wide range of sensitivities were evaluated, and Shell has explored the uncertainty limits and 
consequences by credible attempts to try and ‘break the storage system’. 
 
4.1 DYNAMIC STORAGE MODELLING 
Four distinct simulation models have been developed: two homogeneous box models for 
Goldeneye and the overburden (to assess the risk of leakage through wellbores), and two 
heterogeneous full field models (FFM) for the Goldeneye Field and the overburden.  Numerous 
sensitivity calculations were performed to test the impact of various assumptions, the results 
giving confidence that the conclusions drawn from the modelling study are robust.  Of particular 
significance are that the simulation grid resolution and plume mobility issues were explored 
satisfactorily. 
 
4.1.1 Box model for Goldeneye 
This model was successfully used to test the PVT data and the sensitivity of migration patterns to 
relative permeability. From this it was established that the relative permeability end-points have 
only a minor impact on plume displacement.  This is an important conclusion, since relative 
permeability functions are amongst the most sensitive and poorly-constrained of inputs in a 
reservoir simulator, and the ability to model CO2 migration pathways is an important component 
of the mitigation strategy to address the risk of leakage. 
 
4.1.2 Field model for Goldeneye 
A good history match of the hydrocarbon production period had been achieved, and the model 
alterations to include CO2 injection, discussed above, all seem relevant and appropriate.  As 
noted above, the same relative permeability curve was used for both hydrocarbon gas and CO2 
by assuming CO2/brine system is similar to gas/brine.  This assumption is of importance, since, 
as already noted, relative permeability functions are generally sensitive inputs, and most 
simulators do not allow for a change in relative permeability as a function of change in gas 
composition.  The work undertaken with the box model significantly increases confidence that 
predictions of CO2 migration pathways using the FFM model are accurate. 
 
4.1.3 Box model for overburden 
Consideration should be given to the impact of tilting the model in both X and Y directions to 
identify the impact on distance that CO2 would migrate. The field model for the overburden, 
however, did explore the impact of structure on the flow paths. 
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4.1.4 Field model for overburden 
A good effort was made to model the migration of CO2 through the overburden should any 
migration out of the reservoir take place. In the event that CO2 were to escape from the storage 
site (the Captain Sandstone reservoir in the Goldeneye field and its seal comprising the Rødby, 
Hidra and Plenus Marl formations) it might reach the overlying Chalk. The Chalk is likely to 
comprise a significant regional physical and chemical barrier to CO2 migration but there is a 
hypothetical scenario in which CO2 might eventually reach the thick Palaeocene sandstones 
(principally the Mey Sandstone Member). To address this Shell have modelled the migration of 
CO2 within the Mey Sandstone to determine whether a feasible CO2 plume could encounter any 
existing wellbores. The results suggest this is extremely unlikely, and indeed a large proportion 
of the injected CO2 would have to escape from the storage site for there to be a possibility of this 
occurring. There is moreover significant uncertainty in the characterisation of this zone. For 
instance, the extent of small-scale sedimentary rugosity under any impermeable barriers which 
would trap CO2 locally and retard its advance was not considered, leading to probable 
pessimistic (over) prediction of CO2 migration. 
 
It is noted that a large pore volume multiplier was used in the overburden field model at the 
edges to ensure a constant pressure boundary. This was reviewed with Shell and discussed in the 
context of a comparison with the Regional Aquifer modelling (see below). 
 
4.2 REGIONAL AQUIFER MODELLING 
 
While the Full Field Model was well matched during the hydrocarbon production period, an 
alteration to some of the aquifer permeability values (increasing these by a factor of 1.9) was 
required to match the observed pressure rise due to aquifer recharge after the field was shut-in. 
The shut-in period between cessation of production and the start of CO2 injection has thus been 
beneficial in terms of further constraining the Full Field Model.  Changes in the aquifer 
permeability did not alter the validity of the history match during the hydrocarbon production 
phase of field life. 
 
The main issues resulting from the review and explored with Shell were: 
 
 Radically different fault patterns, linkage and fault permeability are incompatible with 
the excellent production history-match of the field and surrounding aquifer, which takes 
into account adjacent field operations, and therefore it can be concluded that the features 
of the geological model that will determine the migration pathways for CO2 are well 
constrained. 
 
 There is a possibility of Shell continuing to receive updated pressure information from 
other fields in the Captain Fairway to better calibrate predictive dynamic models etc.; this 
is to be encouraged to further improve the predictive capacity of the models, and the 
support of the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in obtaining these 
data should be sought. 
 
CR/14/09494: Version 1.0  Last modified: 2015/08/10 15:11 
 9 
5 Storage capacity  
A range of estimates of CO2 storage capacity for the site were produced using both static 
(analytical) and numerical dynamic methods. The static methods are based on the voidage 
created by the volume of hydrocarbons and water extracted from the field, modified by a range 
of factors that reduce the volume available for storage (such as recharge of the depleted field by 
brine migrating from the Captain aquifer that is in lateral continuity with the field) and another 
set of factors that increase it (such as dissolution of CO2 into the formation brine). The static 
estimates take into account the uncertainty in the pore volume of the field and the volume of 
hydrocarbons initially in place. They indicate a “most likely” storage capacity of 34 Mt of CO2, 
with a range of possible storage capacity between about 25 Mt and 47 Mt of CO2. Even the low 
end estimate provides a very substantial margin above the ~10 to 15 Mt of CO2 to be stored as 
part of the DECC Commercialisation Programme. Shell did a robust assessment of multiple 
injection cases ranging from 10 to 20Mt – we consider the storage capacity to be adequate for all 
injection cases.  
 
The dynamic estimates confirmed that there is a substantial margin of CO2 storage capacity 
above the 20 Mt scenario. The dynamic simulations investigated a range of injection scenarios 
utilising different sets of injection wells. 20 Mt of CO2 could be stored in all scenarios except 
injecting the entire amount through well GYA01 – where it was not possible to inject the whole 
quantity. In all scenarios a Dietz Tongue of CO2 occurred, in which CO2 moved below the 
original hydrocarbon-water contact in the west of the field, but at the end of CO2 injection any 
mobile CO2 in this tongue retreated into the field closure. None of the CO2 in the Dietz Tongue 
reached beyond the spill point between the aquifer and the field.  Although the presence of an 
undiscovered high permeability thief zone connecting the CO2 saturated zones to the spill-point 
was tested in the modelling and found to be incompatible with the history matches, it nonetheless 
did not lead to CO2 migration beyond the spill point. 
 
Other than the risk of migration beyond the spill point due to a thief zone, the main issues 
discussed were: 
 
 Whether Shell would run 10 Mt injection models as part of a revised capacity test.  
 
 Whether Shell would run 10 + 10 Mt injection models to check that the full 20 Mt could 
be injected sequentially at 1 Mt per year. The previous simulations had injected 20Mt at  
2 Mt per year. 
 
In response Shell confirmed that a full suite of 10 Mt dynamic models (including 10 + 10 Mt) 
would be run to further test storage capacity. This has now been carried out and we conclude that 
the storage capacity estimates for the Goldeneye structural closure are robust.  
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6 Wellbore containment  
The construction and, where appropriate, the abandonment, of the wells penetrating the storage 
site and storage complex are described in detail. A total of ten wellbores are identified as having 
the potential to be contacted by the predicted CO2 plume: five production wells, and five more 
widely scattered exploration and appraisal wells (the E&A wells are now plugged and 
abandoned). All of these have an effective primary sealing barrier at top reservoir, and some 
have a secondary sealing barrier higher in the Storage Complex (at the Lista Formation). In 
addition, a comprehensive ‘decision-tree’ type of analysis of the leakage risks at every well in 
the storage complex (18 in total) has been carried out to assess specific risks pertinent to each 
well.   
 
The main wellbore integrity issues resulting from the review and explored with Shell were:  
 
 Integrity of the abandoned E&A wells.  
 
 Contingency planning if cement bond and caliper logs suggest integrity of well is 
compromised. 
 
 Possibility of induced micro-annuli associated with stress changes and strains in the 
overburden due to the depletion / injection cycle. Additional modelling to assess this. 
 
 Hydrate risk if water saturated with CO2 rises up the wellbore. 
 
 Pressure relief options with current well stock. 
 
Based on the initial review, the response from Shell (including additional DIANA modelling of 
wellbore / overburden mechanical interactions) and subsequent re-review, we conclude that the 
wellbore containment case is robust. It was noted during the discussion that the level of well-
related problems during the Goldeneye production phase was extremely low, and that the field 
production history had gone according to plan with no relevant wellbore issues during the 
operations, all of which bodes well for integrity of CO2 storage. 
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7 Transportation and injection 
A detailed plan for injection, covering the key engineering aspects, was presented.  
 
It is noted that elastomer seals in wells will be replaced prior to CO2 injection.  At start-up, some 
CO2 will be vented at the platform, and, to avoid damaging the storage reservoir, only once a 
stable and clean flow of CO2 is achieved will CO2 be injected downhole.  A four-inch methanol 
line will be used during the start-up period only. No other fluids will be used in this line to 
reduce the risk of damage to the line due to incompatibilities between fluids. 
 
All injection wells have a (greater than 200 feet) cement barrier at the primary seal.  Cementation 
reports showed no losses, and there were no significant pressure losses during production. 
Additionally, there were no major incidents reported for the wells during the production phase of 
field life. The most significant issues were repairs to one of the Christmas-trees, and to a control 
line for a sub-surface safety valve, both of which will be replaced prior to CO2 injection. Cement 
bond logs and caliper logs will be run before the start of CO2 injection.  While a risk of loss of 
integrity of the completion due to interactions with CO2 at reservoir intervals was identified and 
discussed with Shell, the reviewers are satisfied that the cement barrier at the primary seal 
provides a more than adequate barrier to prevent loss of CO2 above the target injection horizon. 
 
Injection capacity is assured by the fact that there is redundancy in the system. Of the five wells 
available for injection, only three will be required for injection, and then only one at any one 
time. This will leave one to be used for monitoring and one to be abandoned at reservoir level.  If 
there is loss of injection capacity and these two wells are also used for injection, and if there is 
still insufficient capacity, there is an option to side-track one or more of the accessible wells. 
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8 Risk assessment  
The risk assessment for Goldeneye is based upon an extremely comprehensive ‘bow-tie’ analysis 
whereby unwanted Events are treated in terms of causative Threats and arising Consequences. 
To reduce the risk of an Event occurring, a range of preventative safeguards (e.g. geological 
barriers, monitoring sensors) are placed between the Threat and the Event. Should the Event 
occur, to reduce the impact, a suite of corrective safeguards (e.g. well intervention) are placed 
between the Event and the Consequence.  
 
Potential Consequences considered in the analysis include short inter alia and long-term releases 
of CO2 to seabed, sub-sea and platform blowouts, lateral migration to adjacent fields and 
wellbores, lateral migration of dissolved CO2 etc. 
 
From this a Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) was developed prioritising Threats in terms of the 
likelihood and severity of their Consequence.  
  
A number of issues were explored: 
 
 In terms of RAM likelihoods, previous operational experience in industry is not robust 
for CCS and the extent to which other analogous industry experiences should be 
included. 
 
 Most relevant analogous industries e.g. water injection vs. natural gas storage vs acid gas 
injection vs CO2-EOR. 
 
 Treatment of Threats with very high Consequence in the RAM, and the desirability of 
assigning ALL top severity matrix cells a red colour, irrespective of likelihood.  
 
 Revised assessment for the 10 Mt injection case, where risks would potentially be 
different (and lower) due to smaller CO2 source, potentially fewer injection wells, lower 
pressures etc.  
 
The issues were discussed at length. Shell confirmed that more suitable analogous industries 
would be considered for assessing event likelihoods and risks for the 10 Mt injection case would 
be addressed specifically. The latest risk assessment now includes a very comprehensive 
literature review. 
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9 Monitoring plan  
The MMV plan is robust utilising a limited suite of mature and proven technologies, based on a 
comprehensive technology feasibility review. It focusses on proving containment and 
conformance and is linked closely to the risk assessment and the dynamic predictive flow 
modelling. A base-case monitoring programme is defined together with a contingency 
monitoring programme in case of significant deviations from expected behaviour.  
 
Reservoir pressure and temperatures will be monitored continuously in the injection wells and in 
one or more dedicated monitoring wells. Wireline logging and down-hole fluid sampling is also 
planned to further characterise reservoir processes. Time-lapse 3D seismics will provide full 
spatial coverage of the Storage Complex, with robust 3D spatial coverage of the overburden for 
out-of-reservoir CO2 migration and leakage detection. It also provides some opportunity to 
image CO2 in the reservoir (particularly any CO2 that migrates outside of the original oil-water 
contact). A new purpose-designed baseline 3D seismic survey is to be acquired which is 
commendable. A repeat survey will be acquired after five years, with a second repeat survey 
about one year after cessation of injection. A final 3D survey will be acquired six years after 
closure (see below). Alternative configurations of the 3D seismics, including permanent seabed 
sensors, will be considered. In addition, deployment of possible complementary technologies 
such as downhole optic fibre acoustic cables giving potential for time-lapse 3D vertical seismic 
profiles (VSP) will also be investigated. 
 
A comprehensive shallow monitoring programme is planned, employing seabed imaging, seabed 
sampling and seawater sampling technologies, with the option to update the plan if new 
technologies become available.  
 
The MMV issues resulting from the review and explored with Shell were:  
 
 Possibility of integrating legacy seismic data for outer parts of Storage Complex 3D 
seismic baseline. 
 
 The extent to which repeat 3D seismic surveys of more limited area could be utilised to 
reduce costs and environmental impact balanced against risk of having to re-mobilise if 
small survey does reveal non-conformance. 
 
 The extent to which 4D VSP might replace the 3D mid-term repeat seismic survey. 
 
 The need to plan the extent of the repeat survey very carefully to make sure that specific 
risks are fully addressed and conformance verification objectives are maintained. Full 
surveillance of the original oil-water contact perimeter would likely be required.  
 
 Timing of the mid-term (5-year) survey in terms of predictive models and also with 
respect to 5-year DECC review. 
 
 Seismic sensitivity analysis including modelling for time-shifts as well as reflectivity 
changes and the relative effects of pressure and fluid saturation on seismic response. 
 
 Suitability or otherwise of well breakthrough times as a conformance criterion. 
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 Selected monitoring tools need to be robust against false positives (e.g environmental 
baseline survey).  
 
 The desirability of carrying out explicit modelling and risk assessment of the 10 Mt 
injection case because of different CO2 volumes, pressures mass of CO2 below the 
various wells, may well have different conformance criteria. 
 
In response, Shell carried out additional rock physics analysis to test sensitivity to time-shifts and 
improved their pressure sensitivity calculation. They also confirmed that revised 10 Mt injection 
models would be used to check conformance criteria. We are therefore satisfied that the 
proposed monitoring plan, both base-case and contingency elements, is fit-for-purpose.  
  
CR/14/09494: Version 1.0  Last modified: 2015/08/10 15:11 
 15 
10 Corrective measures plan  
A corrective measures plan has been developed, based on the risk assessment and focussing on 
addressing significant irregularities, with the ultimate aim of preventing or repairing leakage or 
emissions of CO2.  
 
A full range of leakage scenarios has been assessed, prioritising the various possibilities for 
wellbore leakage, but also addressing leakage via the geological seals. 
 
A comprehensive portfolio of corrective measures has been designed ranging from additional 
contingency monitoring, through adaptation of the injection programme, to wellbore 
interventions, and if necessary, a full well kill by the drilling of a new relief well. 
 
Two hypothetical remediation scenarios have been developed, showing workflows for correcting 
leakage through a platform injection well and through an abandoned E&A well. 
 
An assessment of the likelihood of remedial work being successful was undertaken. This 
concluded that chances of successful remediation were highest with a platform well leak and 
lowest for leakage through the geological seals. This is in line with the expectations of the 
Directive guidance documents (GD2). 
 
The main corrective measures issues resulting from the review and explored with Shell were:  
 
 If there is an unexpected increase in pressure in any of the planned injection wells, which 
could lead to a loss of containment, an additional well previously used for production 
could be used as a replacement CO2 injection well.  
  
 Any evidence of leakage from one of the platform wells would be addressed by a 
workover. 
 
We conclude that the corrective measures plan is fully in line with regulatory and operational 
considerations. 
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11 Provisional post-closure plan 
A provisional post-closure plan has been developed, which would be subject to revision during 
the course of the project. It is designed to meet the requirements of the Directive in a pragmatic 
and cost-effective way and aiming to transfer responsibility for the site six years after cessation 
of injection.  
 
Platforms and wells will be closed within three years of ceasing injection, with down-hole 
monitoring maintained for as long as practicable (up to three years). Additional post-closure 
monitoring will comprise two 3D seismic surveys the first one year after closure and a final one, 
at least five years after the first post-closure survey. These will be augmented by seabed / 
environmental surveys, with emphasis on detecting leakage at the wellheads. Resources will also 
be made available for the UK authority to carry out two post-transfer seabed leakage surveys 
(multi-beam echosounding or similar technology). 
 
Shell will use the comprehensive post-closure monitoring programme to demonstrate that at the 
point of transfer, the CO2 will not be leaking, it will be behaving as predicted in terms of 
pressure and plume conformance and it will be progressively approaching gravitationally-stable 
equilibrium. The latter will initially be via buoyant trapping within the structural closure and 
subsequently, on much longer time-scales, by dissolution into the formation water.  
 
The main issues arising from the review and discussed with Shell include: 
 
 Validity of reducing the indicative 20-year default post-closure period, as required by the 
Directive, to less than ten years. 
 
 Long-term stabilisation criteria, including down-dip migration of dissolved CO2. 
 
 Post-transfer monitoring. 
 
From the discussions and clarifications we conclude that the provisional post-closure is 
scientifically sound and likely to be effective, with the proviso that it might be subject to revision 
as the project proceeds and more information becomes available.  
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12 Concluding remarks 
It is clear that the technical studies carried out by Shell are founded on a remarkably 
comprehensive suite of modern high-quality datasets and are in line with the current state-of-the 
art. All of the elements of the project technical study meet or exceed the necessary level of detail. 
Uncertainties are constrained and understood, and linked to a monitoring and remediation 
strategy. The probability therefore of unexpected irregularities leading to adverse outcomes 
sufficient to threaten the project is exceedingly small. 
 
We conclude therefore that the Goldeneye storage site is characterised and understood to the 
degree required by the regulations and is suitable for the purpose of storing 10 –20 million 
tonnes of CO2 injected according to the specified plan. The British Geological Survey has 
prepared a signed statement to this effect. 
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Annex 1: BGS letter 
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Appendix 1: Review of documents provided by Shell for 
initial review 
Static Model Overburden.pdf 
Static Model Aquifer.pdf 
Static Model Field.pdf 
Geochemical Reactivity Report.pdf 
IIP Volumes Estimate.pdf 
Report on Results of Lab Experiments Geo-mechanical Investigation - Chemo-mechanical response of Captain 
Sandstone to CO2 injection.pdf 
SCAL report.pdf 
Seismic Interpretation Report.pdf 
Bow-tie risk assessment for 20Mt.pdf 
Conceptual_Well_Completion_Design_Proposal.pdf 
Corrective_Measures_Plan_provisional29.pdf 
Dynamic_modelling_report_Longannet_update_will_be_given_at_workshop.pdf 
Measurement_Monitoring_and_Verification_Plan_provisional.pdf 
Petrophysical_Modelling_Report_ZP-9032-00001_A01.pdf 
PVT_Report.pdf 
Well_Functional_Specification.pdf 
PCCS-05-PT-ZP-9025-00003 - Monitoring Technology Feasibility Report provisional.pdf 
PCCS-05-PT-ZP-9025-00004 - Geomechanics Summary Report.pdf 
 
Draft (work in progress) Storage Permit Application 
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Appendix 2: Technical presentations at 1st Engagement 
Session  
03 - BGS External Review engineering overview 5Mar14 version 2.pptx 
04 - Goldeneye External Review Geoscience Feb 2014.pptx 
05 - Geochemical_Reactivity_2014_03_05.ppt 
06 - Well Integrity and Containment assessment - 5 March 2014.pptx  
07 - Goldeneye_Geomechanics_Review_5Mar2014.pptx 
08a - RE_slides_March2014_v1.pptx 
08b - Goldeneye SCAL Summary.pptx 
08c - RE_slides_March2014_stress_tests.pptx 
09 - Injection Wells.pptx 
10 - Site and risk assessment v2.pptx 
11 - Monitoring Technology Selection External Review 2014.pptx 
12 - Goldeneye MMV Plan External Review 2014.pptx 
13 - Corrective Measures.pptx 
14 - Handover Criteria and Provisional Post Closure Plan - for BGS - LT OT.pptx 
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Appendix 3: Technical presentations at 2nd Engagement 
Session  
Goldeneye_BGSReview_Geomech_May2014.pptx 
External_Review_of_Goldeneye_Store_II-Well_Integrity&Containment_20May_2014.pptx 
2014_05_External_Review_-_Wells_-_Ajay.pptx 
Goldeneye_MMV_Plan_External_Review_May20_2014.pptx 
Bowtie_Analysis_-_Presentation_to_BGS_-_Sheryl_Hurst.pptx 
External_Review_-_Presence_of_high_perm_streak_May20_2014.pptx 
Goldeneye_External_Review_Geoscience_input_May_2014.pptx 
Goldeneye_Por_Perm_Transforms_19_May_2014.pptx 
Injection_Wells_depths_vs_Top_of_Cemen.pdf 
Goldeneye_External_Review_Part_II_Geochemical_Reactivity_2014_05_20.ppt 
PCCS_External_Review_2_Reservoir_Engineering_CT.pptx 
E&A_Wells_comparison_to_UKOA_12.pdf 
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Appendix 4: Further documentation provided subsequent 
to 2nd Engagement Session  
Petrophysical Modelling Report ZP-9032-00001-A02.pdf 
Static Model Aquifer ZG-0580-00003-A02a.pdf 
Static Model Field ZG-0580-00004-A03.pdf 
Static Model Overburden_ZG-0580-00005-A02.pdf 
Dynamic_modelling_report_FEED_2014_update.docx 
Risk Assessment A0.docx 
